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We document the effects of group affiliation on the initial performance of 2,713 Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) in India under three regulatory regimes during the period 1990-2004. We 
distinguish between two competing hypotheses regarding group affiliation: the “certification” 
and the “tunneling” hypotheses.  We lend support to the latter by showing that the underpricing 
of group companies is higher than that of stand-alone companies. We ascribe the higher initial 
returns of group IPOs to investor overreaction. Ex post, we find that group-affiliated companies 
have a higher probability of survival over the long term: groups support their affiliates to 
maintain their reputation.  
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The decision to go public through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) is one of the most 
critical decisions in the life cycle of a firm. Due to its presumed importance, it has become one of 
the most widely researched topics in the finance literature. One aspect of this literature is the use 
of some form of certification to reduce the costs associated with an IPO.   To alleviate the costs 
associated with the IPO decision, firms often build their reputation by obtaining different types 
of quality certifications to signal their true value to the market.  Some popular certification 
strategies include employing a reputable auditor [see Beatty, 1989], associating with a venture 
capitalist with an established track record [see Barry, Muscarella, Peavy and Vetsuypens (1990)], 
hiring a well-known underwriter [see Carter, Dark and Singh (1998)], attracting strong 
institutional affiliation [see Hamao, Packer and Ritter (2000)], and recruiting a good quality 
management team [see Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005)].1 
One form of certification, popular in many countries where family-controlled businesses 
play a dominant role in the economy, is affiliation to a business group. In this paper, we aim to 
address three main issues related to business group affiliation and initial firm performance in the 
Indian context: 
1. Does affiliation with a private business group, domestic Indian or foreign, act as a 
form of certification at the time of the IPO, as reflected in its initial underpricing?  
2.  Does the long-run survival/success probability of such group-affiliated companies 
differ from that of stand-alone companies?  
3.  How do IPOs of firms that are affiliated with business groups, both Indian and 
foreign, perform in the long run in terms of returns to investors?  
These questions arise in the context of the family business structure which dominates a 
vast proportion of enterprises in India. Ownership and control by families is common for many 
companies in the emerging market countries in Asia and Latin America, as well as in some 
industrialized countries in Europe. Hence, group affiliation is an important global issue that has 
an impact on firms in many parts of the world, and in turn, on their financial markets. A specific 
                                                 
1 There is a vast literature on the role of certification in IPOs.  We do not attempt to survey this 
literature in any detail here, but rather provide a few examples to set our research in context. 
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instance of this broad picture is in India, where large family-owned business groups control 
several firms through complex cross-holdings.   
On the one hand, group affiliation can be considered to be a positive signal by investors 
as the company is perceived to be backed by established promoters with a track record of 
performance. This argument is in line with the certification hypothesis, on the assumption that 
investors face less uncertainty regarding a firm’s value, due to its affiliation with a group, thus 
leading to less underpricing of the IPO. On the other hand, however, the recent literature on 
family-owned business groups, particularly in the Asian context, reveals that many of the 
controlling owners of family-owned business groups may “tunnel” the cash flows from 
companies in which they have low cash flow rights to companies in which they have high cash 
flow rights, relative to their control rights [see Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) and Faccio and 
Lang (2002), for example].  This evidence suggests that group affiliation may act as a negative 
signal regarding a firm’s value. Thus, the complexity associated with cross-holdings between 
group companies increases outside investors’ uncertainty, leading to greater underpricing.  
Therefore, there are two competing hypotheses regarding the effect of group certification on 
firms’ initial performance: the “certification” hypothesis, which predicts lower underpricing for 
group-affiliated companies, and the “tunneling” hypothesis, which predicts the opposite.  
We aim to bring greater clarity to our understanding of the evolution of pyramidal 
groups, in which companies are connected by a hierarchical structure of ownership relationships, 
by studying the effect of group affiliation on firm performance. The existing literature on 
pyramidal organizations does not attempt to disentangle the web of such organizations. Rather, 
so far, most of the papers focus on the effect of group affiliation on firm performance (based on 
accounting and market variables) as measured on an ex post basis. In contrast, we attempt to 
address part of the pyramidal organizations’ evolutionary process, by examining whether the 
market recognizes group affiliation as a positive or a negative signal, right at the point where 
public investors are considering acquiring ownership.   In this context, we also address the 
endogeneity problem that is associated with most of the studies related to ownership structure 
and firm performance [see Demsetz and Lehn (1985)]. The observed relationship of ownership 
structure to firm value at a given point of time can be the outcome of market forces, which react 
to the ownership structure. Thus, any significant relationship may be spurious. However, if the 
relationship is measured at the time of a firm’s initial entry into the stock market, the 
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endogeneity problem will not affect the causal relationship between ownership structure, as 
defined by group affiliation, and firm value. 
 To our knowledge, this is the second paper that addresses the ex-ante effects of group 
affiliation and the market’s perception of firm value. The first was a paper by Dewenter, Novaes 
and Pettway (2001), which addressed the effects of group affiliation and the initial performance 
for the IPOs of Japanese firms affiliated with business groups. They conclude that group-
affiliated companies pay higher costs in the form of higher IPO underpricing due to the 
additional costs incurred by investors to analyze the complexity associated with group-affiliated 
companies.  
Our study differs from that of Dewenter et al. [2001] in at least five respects. First, the 
institutional features, economic environment and the group structure vary significantly between 
India and Japan [see Khanna and Palepu (1997) and (2000)]. Second, their sample includes only 
159 IPOs that were issued in Japan between 1981 and 1994.  Our study uses a more recent time 
period (1990-2004) and is based on a much larger sample size (2,713 IPOs).  
Third, apart from the IPOs of companies affiliated with domestic groups (as in the 
Dewenter et al., 2001 study), we also study those of companies affiliated with private foreign 
groups and the government. (This classification is not peculiar to India and is relevant in many 
other emerging market countries.)    Foreign groups are typically large multinational corporations 
that are thought of as more efficient and transparent in their corporate governance practices. On 
the other hand, since the company going public is typically a subsidiary of the multinational 
company, there is an inherent conflict of interest between the parent and these subsidiaries, with 
regard to various transfer payments for the use of brands, technology and corporate services.  
Companies controlled by the governments, both state and central, are often regarded as being 
subject to political and bureaucratic interference, and therefore are not looked upon favorably by 
investors. On the other hand, these companies are subject to closer public scrutiny through 
oversight bodies empowered by the state legislatures and the national parliament. The question 
we wish to examine is whether the market views the IPOs of companies in the three groups 
somewhat differently. We are also able to investigate the effects of structural changes in the 
market and in the regulatory framework, since the period of our study spans three different 
regulatory regimes in India.  During this period, the Indian economy emerged from a highly 
regulated, state-controlled structure to a relatively liberalized, open one.  
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Fourth, we examine, on an ex post basis, the performance of companies after the IPO. 
Our analysis casts some light on the subsequent evaluation of group affiliation well after the IPO, 
and presents a more complete picture of changing market perceptions over time. Last, but not 
least, as an alternative explanation to the one proposed by Dewenter et al. [2001], for greater 
underpricing of group-affiliated firms, we propose and test the over-reaction hypothesis in the 
context of IPOs. We argue that the opaqueness of the IPO process may not be the explanation for 
this phenomenon in the Indian context; rather, it is investors’ interest in the new issues of group-
affiliated firms that drives higher underpricing of the group affiliated firm IPOs compared to 
their stand-alone counterparts.    
 Our overall conclusion, similar to Dewenter et al. [2001], is that group-affiliated 
companies experienced greater underpricing than their stand-alone counterparts in their IPOs. 
However, we cannot concur with the conclusion of Dewenter et al. [2001] that underpricing 
occurs to offset the cost of the complexity associated with group companies. This is because we 
find IPOs of foreign group-affiliated companies also exhibit higher underpricing than domestic 
group-affiliated companies. If we used the argument of Dewenter et al. [2001], we would expect 
that private foreign groups should be more complex, with numerous chains of cross holdings. 
However, most of the (parent) private foreign groups in our sample are large multinational 
companies based in the United States and the United Kingdom. These groups do not generally 
have complex cross holdings and are presumed to abide by more stringent disclosure norms.2  
Thus, we can attribute the higher underpricing of the IPOs of companies affiliated with groups to 
the “tunneling” activities of the controlling groups, perhaps accentuated by investor overreaction 
at the time of the IPO. 
 Using data on investor over-subscription, a proxy for investor overconfidence, we also 
provide evidence that behavioral models may explain the higher underpricing of group firm IPOs 
better than traditional information asymmetry arguments used by Dewenter et.al. [2001].3  We 
                                                 
2 However, as pointed out earlier, private foreign groups may have a conflict of interest between 
the Indian affiliate and the overseas parent, due to royalties and other transfer payments paid to 
the parent, which may partly explain our results. 
 
3 Several papers in the recent IPO literature relate IPO underpricing to the overreaction of 
investors. Jaggia and Thosar [2004] test the behavioral model proposed by Daniel, Hirshleifer 
and Subrahmanyam (DHS) [1998], using a sample of IPOs of high-tech stocks that were issued 
during the technology bubble in the late 1990s in the US. They obtain results that support the 
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find that the extent of oversubscription is positively correlated with the degree of underpricing. 
This clearly shows that the excess demand of investors, manifested by the extent of their 
oversubscription is an important explanatory variable for the greater underpricing of group-
affiliated firm IPOs.  
We find that companies controlled by the government are the least underpriced. Although 
this result is surprising, we discuss it in more detail in section III. On an ex post basis, we find 
that group-affiliated companies survived better in the stock market than stand-alone companies; 
however, their long-run stock market performance is worse than stand-alone companies that 
survived. It appears that the overreaction in the short run around the time of the IPO is reversed 
over time.  
 This paper is organized into five sections. The introduction in this section is followed by 
a brief review of IPOs and business groups and the related literature is discussed in section II.4 A 
short description of the Indian primary market is also provided in the same section. The 
description of the data used for this study and the related statistics are presented in section III. 
Section IV discusses our empirical results. Concluding remarks are presented in section V. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Group affiliation and firm performance 
The relationship between group affiliation and firm performance has been well 
documented in the finance, strategy and industrial organization literatures.  The broad consensus 
is that the specific institutional context of the economy plays an important role in determining 
the merits and demerits of group affiliation. The evidence, so far, suggests that in an environment 
with a relatively strong institutional infrastructure, enterprises engaged in multiple businesses 
                                                                                                                                                             
behavioral predictions proposed in DHS that investor overconfidence causes overreaction to 
initial private signals, and the self-attribution bias of investors, results in the initial momentum. 
The momentum eventually results in long run reversals. This trend is evident in many IPO 
studies: most IPO papers report initial underpricing followed by long-term underperformance. 
Using more robust empirical analysis, Purnanadam and Swaminathan [2004], also report 
evidence in support of the DHS  model (as opposed to rational information asymmetry models) 
to explain IPO underpricing. 
 
4 To keep the paper more focused, our discussion of the IPO literature is mainly restricted to 
papers that are related to the certification hypothesis. 
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under-perform relative to those that are focused on specific industries (excluding leveraged buy 
out (LBO) deals) [see, for example, Comment and Jarrell (1995), Berger and Ofek (1995) and 
Shin and Stulz (1998)]. This “conglomerate discount,” interpreted in the context of business 
groups, would suggest that there are diseconomies associated with group affiliation.   
In contrast, in an environment with a relatively weak institutional infrastructure, 
companies that belong to large, highly diversified groups tend to outperform stand-alone 
companies. Firms in markets with a poor institutional infrastructure incur higher costs to acquire 
finance, technology and managerial talent. Group affiliation reduces these costs due to 
economies of scope and scale, and results in better performance.5  On the other hand, if these 
necessary inputs for the growth of firms are easily available in the marketplace, the positive 
group effect may disappear. In such cases, group affiliation could be expensive, due to a lack of 
focus in one particular activity, resulting in underperformance of group-affiliated companies 
when compared to their stand-alone counterparts. This conclusion would be in line with the 
“conglomerate discount” hypothesis regarding the industrialized countries, primarily the United 
States. A recent empirical study by Gopalan, Nanda and Seru [2005] on Indian business groups 
supports the former conjecture. They find that during conditions of financial distress group-
affiliated companies support each other through intra-group loans to reduce the negative 
spillover effects of group reputation. However, this support for group-affiliated firms may come 
at the cost of overall financial performance.  These two effects need to be disentangled in order 
to come to a clear cut conclusion regarding the effects of group affiliation on firm performance.  
The other aspect of group affiliation is the relationship to the corporate governance of the 
firm.  Interest in the relationship between group affiliation, corporate governance, and the impact 
on firm performance has increased with the growing importance of corporate governance issues, 
both in policy-making and in the academic literature. Many academic papers report that group 
affiliation is detrimental to firm performance, due to the possible expropriation of funds by the 
controlling group. The argument is that group companies are prone to poor internal governance, 
especially when there is excessive control by a family that owns a significant stake. This happens 
especially when the control rights of the ultimate owners are out of line with their cash flow 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Khanna and Palepu [2000], who relate these differences in the performance 
of companies to the “substitution” mechanism provided by groups. 
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rights in a group-affiliated firm. In this context, several papers report evidence of “tunneling” 
activities ― uni-directional, often undisclosed, flows of funds within a group. Typically, these 
would be from firms where the ultimate owner has low cash flow rights (compared to control 
rights) to firms where the ultimate owner has high cash flow rights.6    
Thus, the issue of group affiliation and firm performance is not a straightforward one. 
This debate is very pertinent in the Indian context, mainly due to the seemingly conflicting 
results of the Khanna and Palepu [2000] and Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan [2002] papers. 
After comparing the accounting and market-based performance of group-affiliated Indian 
companies with similar stand-alone companies, Khanna and Palepu [2000] conclude that group 
affiliation is a positive signal. However, they also point out that the positive relationship holds 
only for well-diversified and relatively large business groups. Without distinguishing firms based 
on the extent of diversification, Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan [2002] argue that firms 
affiliated with groups are prone to “tunneling,” thus causing a reduction in firm value; 
consequently, group affiliation could be a negative signal.  
 However, both these papers, along with similar ones in other countries, examine the ex 
post performance of firms that are affiliated with groups in comparison with their stand-alone 
counterparts.  If group affiliation is regarded as positive or negative, this ought to be reflected in 
the pricing of the firm’s shares when they are offered for sale to outside investors in the first 
place.  In line with this argument, our study aims to examine the ex-ante perceptions of investors, 
through the underpricing of IPOs, thus throwing light on the seemingly contradictory prior 
studies in the context of Indian business groups. 
2.2 The Indian primary market 
The primary market for equity in India gained momentum after the liberalization 
initiative taken by the government in the early 1990s. Following the improvement in the growth 
rate of the economy at that time, there were a large number of IPOs, particularly during the 
period 1990-2004.7  Unlike the US market, which is the basis for many IPO studies, the Indian 
                                                 
6 Several studies document such evidence, including those of Classens, Djankov, Fan and Lang 
[1999]; Classens, Djankov, Lang [2000a]; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang [2000b]; Johnson, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer [2000]; Johnson, and Friedman [2000]; Nam [2001]; Obata 
[2001], and Baek, Kang and Lee [2006].   
 
7 Source: Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Public Issue Guidelines. 
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IPO market has been dominated by retail investors [see Aggarwal (2000)]. During the last fifteen 
years, the Indian IPO market has undergone many changes that are widely seen to have improved 
its transparency and efficiency. In particular, the initial years of liberalization, after 1990-91, 
witnessed a boom in the Indian IPO market. With fewer regulations during this period, many 
entrepreneurs used the primary market as the main vehicle to raise capital as well as reduce their 
own holdings. A majority of the IPOs in our sample were issued during the first five years of 
liberalization (1990-95). The spurt in interest in the equity markets also witnessed several 
instances of “fly-by-night” entrepreneurs who eroded investor wealth.8  During 1995-96, the new 
securities regulator, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), introduced more 
regulations on IPO pricing and enforced other restrictions on promoters, such as the lock-in 
period for their holdings.9 This resulted in a slump in the IPO market immediately following this 
period. 
To encourage equity participation after the 1995-98 slump, between 1999 and 2000 the 
SEBI tried to shore up investor confidence by tightening its norms for public issues of equity. 
Some of the main changes are related to: (1) financial reporting norms; (2) allotment norms; (3) 
cost/efficiency norms; (4) transparent book building procedures.10  
Thus, there have been three distinct regimes in the Indian primary market, namely, (1) the 
immediate post-liberalization regime (1990-1995), (2) the initial regulated regime (1996-2000), 
and (3) the reformed regulated regime (2001- 2004).   
2.3 The IPO Allotment Process 
The allotment process for IPOs in India is quite different from other markets such as 
those in the United States. In the event of oversubscription, the allotment mechanism in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
8 The weakness of then-prevailing regulations attracted the SEBI’s attention after a major 
primary market scandal related to an infamous IPO by MS Shoes Ltd in 1995. In the same year, 
SEBI took some initiatives by appointing the Malegam Committee to recommend appropriate 
regulations for closer scrutiny of proposed offerings.  See Shah and Thomas [2001] and Rao 
[2002] for more details.  
 
9 In the parlance of the Indian market and regulations, a “promoter” is the controlling shareholder 
in the company, and thus, is responsible for its management. 
 
10 Details of these changes are provided in the more detailed version of this paper available upon 
request from the authors. 
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Indian market is not discretionary.  It is based on a formula decided by the company on the 
advice of the investor banker, but is strictly based on the guidelines issued by the regulator and 
supervised by the stock exchanges. There have been some changes to the allocation formula over 
the sample period.11  However, the formula has always had the common feature that, in the event 
of over-subscription, the allotment is made through a rationing mechanism. The rationing system 
creates an artificial barrier for an investor to have his/her demand filled in full. Since 2000, when 
the book-building mechanism was introduced in the Indian market, investment bankers 
managing some, but not all, IPOs have used it.  However, the use of book-building still does not 
rule out the possibility of excess demand and consequent oversubscription.  This is particularly 
true if a large number of potential investors do not participate in this process and the book-
building process does not lead to full price-discovery.  Furthermore, orders placed in the book-
building process are not binding, and could encourage larger players to game the system by not 
registering their true demand in the book-building process. This is evident in the Indian market, 
as the oversubscription was not alleviated consequent to the introduction of the book building 
process. On the contrary, a large allotment scam was reported in 2004. Some investors were 
prosecuted for creating multiple false accounts to increase their allocations in “hot” issues.12  
This provides some indirect evidence of the over-reaction hypothesis in the Indian market.  
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
< INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
The data set we assembled consists of attributes of IPOs recorded in the CMIE database 
on Indian capital markets between the years 1990 and 2004.13  The CMIE classifies a company 
                                                 
11 Since the late-1970’s, the allotment ratios have been different for various investor categories, 
such as institutional investors, non-resident Indians, and retail investors, typically with a 
progressive structure built in: small investors receive a greater proportional allocation than larger 
investors.  This has been since been altered to a straight proportional allocation in each category, 
in the aftermath of the allotment scam in 2004. 
 
12 For example, see the article by Sucheta Dalal published in the newspaper, Indian Express, on 
the 26th April 2004, under the title “Share allotment drama: little to smile about,” for a brief 
description of the allotment scam. 
 
13 As per the Securities Exchanges Board of India (SEBI)  and Prime Database services records, 
the actual number of public issues raised (including IPOs)in India during 1990 to 2004 was 5667. 
There is no clear information on the exact number of IPOs among the total public issues. Our 
sample represents around 52 percent of all public issues issued in India during 1990-2004 and 
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as affiliated with a group based on an analysis of company announcements and a qualitative 
assessment of the behavior of the firm in relation to the rest of the group.14 Table 1 presents the 
summary statistics of our sample.  We also divide our sample period into three regimes and 
present a regime-wise classification of our data in the table. This characterization of the different 
regimes in the IPO market is designed to control for the effect of structural changes in the Indian 
market on the results from our study. Regime 1 witnessed the highest number of IPOs, while 
regime 3 had the lowest. Thus, Regime 1 and Regime 3 have been “hot” and “cold” issue 
periods, respectively, for the Indian market, to use the terminology of Ritter (1984). However, 
unlike in the US market, where the hot issue period was driven by a boom in specific industrial 
sectors (e.g. the resources sector), in the Indian market, it was due to structural changes in the 
political economy, primarily through liberalization.  
There are 2,713 IPOs in the fifteen-year period of our study in our data set. During this 
period, a majority of the IPOs (2,147, or 79 percent) were issued by stand-alone firms.15 The 484 
IPOs of private Indian group-affiliated firms represent 18 percent of the total sample.  The 
remaining 82, or 3 percent of the IPOs, are shared between firms affiliated with the government 
(33, or a little more than 1 per cent) and those affiliated with foreign companies (49, or a little 
less than 2 per cent). The number of IPOs of stand-alone firms is substantially higher than for 
                                                                                                                                                             
includes substantially all the IPOs issued during this period. We also used the PRIME database 
that contains Indian primary market data for: 1. matching the information available with CMIE; 
2. underwriter information; and 3. over-subscription details for the IPOs. To rank the quality of 
underwriters, we use date from the league tables obtained from ICICI Securities and Finance Ltd.  
   
14 See the Prowess Users’ Manual, Version 2, p.4, for details. Previous studies of group 
ownership in India such as those of Khanna and Palepu [2000]; Bertrand, Mehta and 
Mullainathan [2002]; and Gopalan, Nanda and Seru [2005] use the same classification. 
 
15 Our sample size remains 2,713 in Tables 1, 2 and 3. The sample size changes thereafter based 
on the availability of data for the independent variables in our analysis.  Due to these data gaps, 
the sample size decreases to between 1,91l to 1,905 in Table 4 and between 1,884 to 1,837 in 
Table 5. However, we did not find any systematic bias in our reduced sample size. We check this 
by conducting a simple mean difference test to examine whether the means of independent 
variables in the reduced sample are significantly different from those of the full sample.  We also 
use propensity matching method as described in Table 5. The reduction in sample size in Table 6 
is mainly due to the loss of data points for the calculation of the 36 months window of abnormal 
returns: the observations in the later years, especially after 2002, do not have 36 months 
abnormal returns, since our sample ends in 2004.    
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IPOs of firms in the other categories. This evidence suggests that most IPOs in our sample have 
come from new entrepreneurs, after the liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991.  
As shown in Table 1, there has been considerable variation in the number of IPOs in each 
year during our sample period.   Most of the IPOs in each category were issued in the first half of 
the 1990s (Regime 1). This was a boom period for IPOs, largely as a consequence of the opening 
up of the Indian economy. However, in terms of issue size, the second half of the 1990s (Regime 
2) had much larger issues than the first half (Regime 1). The issue size per IPO during Regimes 2 
and 3 (post-1996), is substantially higher that of the pre-1996 period (Regime 1). While part of 
the increase can be attributed to inflation, this broad trend indicates that the IPO market in India 
became more mature after the SEBI’s regulations were introduced, in some cases, and tightened, 
in others, during 1995-96. As a result, most of the issues made in the post-1996 period were by 
larger companies, which could pass the close scrutiny of the regulator. However, the number of 
issues during Regime 3 reduced to a trickle compared to prior years, except for government 
companies, mainly due to the slump in the world capital markets, following the dot-com collapse 
in 2000.  In the case of government companies, the continued volume of IPOs was due to the 
privatization program of the government. The average issue size increased in all firm categories 
over time, indicating the growing maturity of the Indian primary market.   
On the average, underpricing is evident across almost all the years in our sample period 
and across the different categories. Typically, the extent of underpricing is low for firms 
affiliated with the government. Government-affiliated companies experienced overpricing, on 
the average, for several years in the total study period. To some extent, this finding is surprising 
and merits further discussion, especially since several papers report higher underpricing for 
privatization IPOs in many other countries [For instance, see Menyah and Paudyal (1996), Jelic 
and Briston (1999) and (2003), Choi and Nam (1998)].  However, on closer examination, 
Dewenter and Malatesta [1997] find that underpricing is more evident in government 
privatization in unregulated industries. In our case, many of the privatized companies in India 
continued to be regulated by the government, since the government still retained a controlling 
interest in most of them. Hence, our results are consistent with the Dewenter and Malatesta 
[1997] hypothesis.  
Biais and Perotti [2002] try to explain the higher underpricing in the privatization 
programs using a politically-motivated theory. They argue that underpricing in privatization 
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IPOs is often used as strategy to convince middle-class voters to shift their political preferences, 
toward a market-oriented ideology.  In the case of the Indian market, this argument may not hold 
due to the under-developed nature of the economy and the capital market, where only a small 
proportion of the electorate have the resources to directly invest in equities. Hence, the political 
argument may not hold water in the Indian context. 
We believe that the lower underpricing in Indian government IPOs may be attributed to 
two other plausible reasons. First, the size of government IPOs was typically substantially higher 
than that of other IPOs, as seen in Table 1. In general, as documented in prior studies (see 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist [1994], which is being regularly updated on Jay Ritter’s website), 
higher issue size is generally correlated with lower underpricing due to the impact of asymmetric 
information as well as liquidity. Our discussion relating to Table 2 which follows this discussion 
sheds more light on this issue. Second, the bulk of the privatization program, particularly in 
Regime 1 consisted of selling a substantial proportion of the issue to government-controlled 
institutional investors, such as the Life Insurance Corporation of India and the Unit Trust of 
India, on the basis that a larger number of people, who are claimholders in these entities, would 
benefit indirectly.  
In the case of firms affiliated with Indian group companies, underpricing on the average 
was as high as 394 per cent in 1999 and came down substantially in 2001 and 2002, and was as 
low as 17.4 per cent in 2002. In 2001, there was only one IPO and it was overpriced. On the 
average, stand-alone companies experienced underpricing across all years in the study period. 
The extent of underpricing, on the average, was the highest in 1999 (689 per cent) and the lowest 
in 2003 (37.5 per cent). Firms affiliated with private foreign groups experienced record 
underpricing with the highest recorded in 1991 (1,392 per cent) and the lowest in 1995 (24 per 
cent). There was a wider variation in other years, but those were typically due to an individual 
outlier in either direction. Table 1 also reports the average 30-day standard deviation of daily 
returns in the post-listing period. As shown in the table, the size of the standard deviation is not 
large enough to explain the extent of underpricing. For instance, the average underpricing for 
private Indian groups is around 140 per cent; however, the average 30-day standard deviation of 
return after the listing is only 5.7 per cent. This shows that investor uncertainty cannot fully 
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explain the extent of underpricing. Thus, underpricing is likely to be due more to investor 
overreaction than to any post-listing risk to investors.16  
< INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE> 
The last panel in Table 1 provides summary statistics for all IPOs, across all groups, on a 
yearly basis. On average, the underpricing in the Indian IPO market during 1990-2004 has been 
95.36 percent. This ranks India as the third largest underpriced market among the 39 countries 
surveyed in the Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist [1994], which has been regularly updated.17 
Figure 1 depicts the information on the number of issues in Table 1 as a time-series plot, with the 
three regimes demarcated along the X-axis. It is clear from the figure that there has been a 
significant reduction in the number of IPOs after Regime 1.  After the boom period in 1995, the 
number of IPOs has declined over the subsequent decade, with a minor blip in 2000.  This 
pattern is evident across the various types of groups we analyze: private domestic and foreign 
group-affiliated companies, government companies and stand-alone companies.  
< INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE> 
Figure 2 shows the extent of IPO underpricing, as measured by the initial returns for 
firms in the four categories, over the years.  It is interesting to see that the extent of underpricing 
was much higher across all categories in Regime 1, compared to the other two regimes, with the 
exception of a spike in Regime 2. However, the spike is due to one IPO in the private foreign 
group. Overall, as mentioned earlier, it is clear that the extent of underpricing has been declining 
over our sample period.  
                                                 
16 Chowdhry and Sherman [1996] argue that in many Asian markets the offer price is set prior to 
the public issue. A low issue price would lead to over-subscription, while a high issue price may 
result in a failure of the issue. To avoid failure, a risk-averse issuer may underprice the issue. 
Loughran and Ritter [2002] and [2004] provide two alternative hypotheses, related to 
underwriters, for severe underpricing. First, when issuers place more importance on hiring 
reputed underwriters, they become less concerned about avoiding underwriters with a reputation 
of severe underpricing. Second, issuers may leave more money on the table when they have 
personal benefits from the underwriters. They argue that there is substantial evidence in the US 
that underwriters open personal brokerage accounts to allocate “hot” IPOs to executives and 
related parties of the issuing company.  Since underpricing in India is severe in all regimes 
(including the “cold” issues period), it may not be due to the second hypothesis. Furthermore, 
unlike in other markets, underwriters in the Indian market do not have any discretion in the 
allotment of “hot” issues to favored clients.   
 
17 The latest update was in May 2006. 
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< INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
Table 2 summarizes the pooled cross-sectional statistics relating to IPOs during the whole 
period 1990-2004. This table summarizes the average values of the key variables based on the 
nature of firm affiliation. Along with average initial return and standard deviation, this table 
contains the average values for other control variables used in this study. This table also shows 
that the highest underpricing, on average, across the fifteen year period of our study is for firms 
affiliated with private foreign groups. Private Indian group-affiliated companies, stand-alone 
companies and government-affiliated companies follow in hierarchical order. It is interesting to 
note that the 30-day standard deviation of returns, after listing, also follows the same hierarchical 
order. However, the magnitudes of the average levels of underpricing are vastly greater than the 
sizes of the respective standard deviations of returns. This suggests that IPO performance, post-
listing, has more to do with investor over-reaction than with the (fundamental) uncertainty of the 
firm value before the IPO. Firms that are affiliated with large groups attract more investors and 
the overreaction led to the high listing prices.  
We further support this conjecture by providing details of the extent of oversubscription 
in Table 2. It is clear from the table that there has been excess demand for IPOs in all categories. 
However, the excess demand, reflected in the extent of oversubscription, is higher among both 
Indian and foreign group-affiliated firms, compared to stand-alone and government-affiliated 
firms. On average, Indian and foreign group-affiliated firms got oversubscribed 14 times, which 
is significantly greater than for stand-alone firms and government-affiliated firms, which were 
oversubscribed 9 and 8 times, respectively.    
The average asset size of the firms in our study varies based on the nature of affiliation. 
Firms with government affiliation are relatively large in size at the time of the IPO.  The IPOs 
from government-affiliated companies are mostly the result of the government’s disinvestment 
plan. Throughout our sample period, the central and state governments in India divested their 
stakes in some of the large public sector companies through IPOs. Consistent with the yearly 
data in Table 1, the underpricing of government-affiliated companies is quite low. These firms 
also exhibit the lowest standard deviation of returns in the post-listing period. It is surprising to 
see that the asset sizes of group-affiliated firms (both domestic and foreign) are smaller than 
those of stand-alone firms. It is generally expected that a venture from an established group 
should be of greater size than a similar venture from a stand-alone firm. The descriptive statistics 
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also indicate that the IPOs of smaller firms are underpriced more often and to a greater degree. 
Thus, asset size is an important control variable in our study.  
Another important variable summarized in the table is the share premium. The share 
premium represents the difference between the par value of the share and the issue price.18  The 
prospectuses of all IPOs clearly state the share premium for a given IPO, with the practice 
continuing even today. Although it is the issue price that matters from an economic perspective, 
there is casual evidence that the share premium, which is widely quoted in the prospectus and 
other related public announcements by the company, acts on investor psychology. Table 2 shows 
that the average premium charged by all affiliated firms is higher than that charged by stand-
alone firms.19 Given that the oversubscription is high for group-affiliated firms, higher premium 
may indicate that group-affiliated firms are perceived as more reputable firms by the investors. 
The subscription details for IPOs by type of investor ― promoters (insiders), the public, 
institutions, and others ― are also summarized in Table 2. The promoters’ participation figures 
clearly show that most of the government-affiliated companies are part of government 
disinvestment plans. The average promoters’ subscription for government-affiliated firms is only 
3.7 per cent. The other affiliated firms (private Indian groups and private foreign groups) have a 
higher level of promoter participation than that of stand-alone firms. The level of public 
participation in all IPOs is quite similar. However, the level of institutional participation varies 
based on the nature of group affiliation. Government-affiliated companies, on the average, have 
the highest level of participation by institutional investors. (Several of the large domestic 
institutional investors are controlled or tightly regulated by the government.) Stand-alone 
                                                 
18 Par value is an accounting concept indicating a standard value per share. Most Indian IPOs are 
issued with a Rs. 10 par value, with the “premium” being the excess of the issue price over par. 
 
19 In our sample there is no significant cross-sectional variation in the offer price. Many studies 
on the US market exclude from consideration IPOs with very low offer prices. Until a few years 
ago, during Regime 1 and part of Regime 2, most IPOs in India were at a standard price of Rs 10 
(or Rs 100, in a few cases) per share, which was “par.”  Of course, this price had no economic 
significance, because significant dilution had occurred, with the result that the number of shares 
at this price was appropriately adjusted.  Indeed, several of the quality issues were made at par in 
earlier years. Thus, in contrast with the US studies, we segment the IPOs by their asset size 
rather than by their offer price.  It should be noted that we did not include the share premium in 
our regression analysis as it is part of the issue price. In addition, the issue price is also an 
ingredient in the calculation of the initial return of the IPO, which is our dependent variable.  
 
 17
companies come next. It is again surprising to see that institutional participation is quite low in 
both categories of group-affiliated companies. It is generally presumed that higher (or lower) 
level of institutional investor participation signals a higher (or lower) quality of the firm making 
the IPO. However, it can also be argued that higher institutional participation is not desirable in 
the case of group-affiliated companies, from the perspective of the controlling group, since a 
higher level of participation of institutional investors reduces the group’s control over the firm 
and subjects it to institutional scrutiny.20  It may be that greater underpricing may create excess 
demand, ensuring that the institutions receive smaller allocations, especially since the IPO 
allotment formula typically has a bias towards small investors. 
4. Results 
4.1 Preliminary results 
< INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
Following the preliminary insights from Tables 1 and 2, we extend our analysis to the 
investigation of the statistical significance of the differences between the key variables across the 
different categories of firms. Table 3 presents the results of the tests of the mean differences 
between the key variables. We use analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests to evaluate whether there 
is any evidence that the means of the various sub-populations differ. However, if there are more 
than two sub-groups (we have four categories in our analysis), it is inappropriate to compare 
each pair using a simple t-test because of the problem of multiple testing. For this reason, we 
used the Tukey multiple comparison test, which compares differences between the means, with 
appropriate adjustments for multiple testing [see Tukey (1977) and Bland and Altman (1995)].  
Table 3 tests the differences in the means of each group with those of other groups. For 
instance, the cell at the intersection of the first row and the third column shows the difference 
between the means of private Indian group affiliated companies and stand-alone companies  for 
the initial return variables. The p-values are shown in the parentheses below each mean 
difference value. The initial returns or the extent of underpricing between group-affiliated 
companies, both private Indian and foreign, and stand-alone companies is significantly different. 
The positive mean difference value indicates that the domestic group companies’ mean value for 
                                                 
20 In many cases, institutional investors obtain a seat on the boards of companies where they 
have a stake. 
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initial returns is higher than for stand-alone companies. Likewise, the mean difference values can 
be interpreted for other variables, and used in comparisons between other pairs of groups. The 
initial return of government-affiliated companies is not statistically different from that of 
companies in other categories. However, the asset size is significantly different from that of other 
groups. Table 3 shows that, in terms of asset size, the mean difference value between group-
affiliated companies and their stand-alone counterparts is not statistically significant. The issue 
size of domestic group-affiliated companies is larger than that of stand-alone companies and 
smaller than that of government-affiliated companies. The share premium charged by domestic 
group-affiliated companies is higher than that charged by stand-alone firms, and smaller than that 
charged by foreign group-affiliated companies.  
The difference between the means of the proportions of promoter participation is not 
significantly different between group-affiliated and stand-alone companies. However, there is a 
highly statistically significant difference, in this regard, between group-affiliated companies and 
government-affiliated companies. The same results hold for public participation. The finding 
regarding institutional investor participation is also not that surprising, as discussed in section III. 
The only mean difference value that is statistically significant is between private Indian group-
affiliated companies and stand-alone companies. The level of institutional participation of 
investors for stand-alone companies is higher than that for domestic group-affiliated companies, 
which is in line with the discussion in the previous section.  
The mean difference test shows that the extent of oversubscription for the Indian and 
foreign group-affiliated firms is significantly higher than for stand-alone and government-
affiliated firms. This again confirms investors’ excess demand for the IPOs of group-affiliated 
firms. 
In summary, the results of tests of differences in the means provide strong evidence that 
group-affiliated firms (both domestic and foreign) are quite different from stand-alone 
companies and government-affiliated companies in several respects.   
4.2 Regression results 
< INSERT TABLE 4 HERE> 
Table 4 presents regression results for the initial returns from IPOs to help examine the 
causal relationship between the extent of underpricing and firm characteristics. We consider six 
sets of independent variables.  The first set consists of firm characteristics such as issue size and 
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asset size.21 The second set consists of the group affiliation dummies for three of the four 
categories we have defined.  The third set of characteristics relates to the industry dummies for 
three of the four industry sectors identified – banking, other financial services, manufacturing, 
and other services. (The “other services” category of industries does not have a dummy variable 
attached to it). The fourth set of variables is the dummies for the three regimes (with Regime 3 
being excluded) defined earlier that sub-divide our time series. The fifth set is the investor 
dummies for promoter, public and institutional participation. (The “others” category of investor 
participation is excluded). The dummy variable takes the value 1 for the corresponding category, 
and 0, otherwise. For instance, for the dummy variable defining government companies, the 
value is 1 for the corresponding data related to government companies and 0 for the remaining 
categories. The last set consists of the extent of over-subscription and the quality of underwriters 
as the independent variables. 
We estimate eight regressions for different sets of independent variables, in order to 
assess the incremental impact of each set of variables on the extent of underpricing. Even though 
asset size varies significantly across the different categories we have defined, we find no 
evidence of any significant relationship between asset size and the extent of underpricing. 
However, the coefficient of the issue size of the IPO is negative and significant. This implies that 
the larger the issue size, the lower is the underpricing, which is in line with the results of other 
studies (See, for example, Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) and the references cited 
therein). The domestic group dummy is positive and highly significant in all four regressions. 
Thus, after controlling for other factors, we find that being part of a private Indian group 
influences the extent of underpricing in a positive manner. The same positive relationship for the 
extent of underpricing holds for firms affiliated with private foreign groups. The coefficients for 
the industry dummies are all insignificant. Thus, underpricing is seen across all industry 
categories and it is not industry-specific in terms of its relative importance. Of course, it is 
possible that our industry classification is too coarse to detect such effects, particularly if they 
vary over time.  We could not examine this issue in greater detail due to the paucity of detailed 
industry classification data (along the lines of data in the industrialized countries). 
                                                 
21 The correlation between issue size and asset size is quite low (0.021). Hence, there is no 
serious issue of potential multicollinearity here. Also, it should be noted that we dropped the age 
of the firm as an independent variable, since it is highly correlated with asset size.    
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Our results relating to the variations across regimes are reported in Regressions 3 and 4 in 
Table 4. The coefficient for Regimes 2 is negative and significant. This indicates that firms that 
undertook IPOs during Regime 2 were, on the average, less underpriced compared to the firms 
that issued equity during Regime 1 and Regime 3. Thus, the tighter regulations introduced in 
Regime 2, as discussed in section II.C, had an effect on IPO pricing. Contrary to our expectation, 
based on the prior literature (see, for example, Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) and the 
references cited therein), we find that promoter participation in the IPOs does not influence the 
extent of underpricing. However, institutional investor participation and public participation 
reduces the extent of underpricing. This indicates that institutional interest signals firm quality 
and improves the valuation. However, our result with regard to institutionally-affiliated 
companies runs counter to the conclusion of Hamao, Packer and Ritter [2000] for the Japanese 
market. They find a positive relationship between institutional affiliation and the degree of 
underpricing. It may be that the links within groups are stronger in Japan during the 1990s than 
in India during the period of our analysis 
4.2.1 Testing the over-reaction hypothesis 
<TABLE 5 HERE> 
The evidence so far shows that, the traditional theories of information asymmetry, similar 
to the Dewenter et.al (2001) tradeoff hypothesis between visibility and opaqueness as a 
mechanism for underpricing of group-affiliated firms, for the Japanese market, may not fully 
explain the extent of underpricing in the Indian market. This is mainly due to the higher 
underpricing of foreign group-affiliated firms. We now turn our attention to behavioral 
explanations for understanding the higher underpricing of group affiliated firms. A recent paper 
by Purnanandam and Swaminathan [2004] argue that, in the US market, behavioral explanations 
fit better than traditional, rational models to explain initial underpricing and subsequent 
underperformance of IPOs. In particular, they provide evidence in support of the predictions of 
DHS that stock prices initially overreact to information, due to investor overconfidence that 
gathers further momentum due to the self-attribution bias of investors. The momentum finally 
results in reversal after information is fully revealed. Although Purnanandam and Swaminathan 
[2004] point out that overconfidence enters into picture due to the excess demand of investors 
who are most interested in IPOs, they could not test their conjecture for lack of data regarding 
the excess demand of investors.  
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We are fortunate to be able to obtain data on this excess demand – the extent of over-
subscription of each IPO. With this data, we are able to measure the excess demand of investors, 
and thus provide a proxy for overconfidence and subsequent overreaction. The over-reaction 
hypothesis asserts that the excess demand results from the attention that group-affiliated firms 
attract in relation to stand-alone firms (perhaps due to their respective reputations, for example), 
and creates uncertainty about the allocation that investors will obtain from the IPO. This holds 
especially when the allocation process is rationed accordingly to a well-publicized formula, as in 
the case of Indian market. The higher the extent of over-subscription, the more severe will be the 
shortage in the investors’ allocation. In order to reach their desired allocation, investors will be 
forced to buy the stock after listing in the stock market, thus driving up the price. This results in 
greater underpricing of the IPO, as measured by its initial return. Thus, underpricing and 
oversubscription should be positively related, according to the over-reaction hypothesis. 
   Regression 5 uses the extent of over-subscription, after controlling for all other 
variables in Regression 4, as a variable to explain underpricing in IPOs. Consistent with the 
overreaction hypothesis, we show that the extent of subscription has a positive and highly 
significant coefficient, for both domestic and foreign group-affiliated firms. This confirms that 
the overreaction hypothesis provides a better explanation than the tradeoff hypothesis proposed 
by Dewenter et al. (2001): due to higher over-reaction (estimated by higher subscription) for 
group affiliated firms, there is higher underpricing compared to the stand-alone firms. 
It should be noted that adding the extent of oversubscription as an independent variable 
may lead to problems of reverse causality. On the one hand, excess demand measured by the 
extent oversubscription may drive the price and hence the initial returns. On the other, the 
expectation of high initial returns may lead to oversubscription, as Koh and Walter [1989] argue. 
The standard method of addressing problems of reverse causality is the identification and 
estimation (in the first stage) of an instrumental variable for oversubscription. We tried various 
instrumental variables and found that firm size at the time of the IPO is not only highly 
correlated with the extant of subscription but also is exogenous. We report the results for the 
(second stage of the) two-stage least square regression under Regression 8 in Table 4. This 
regression uses firm size at the time of IPO as the instrumental variable. As shown in the table,  
the implication of this regression are consistent with that of the other regressions: the extent of 
subscription is positively correlated with the initial return.  
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4.2.2 Underwriter quality and underpricing 
There is substantial evidence that the quality of the underwriter partly explains the degree 
of underpricing in IPOs in many countries. It has been found that the underwriter’s reputation 
generally reduces the extent of underpricing for IPOs and thus underwriters, similar to groups in 
our context, may provide certification benefits. Although there are no well-defined measures of 
underwriter quality in the Indian market, we define the top ten underwriters (in terms of the 
value underwritten) from the league tables for each of the fifteen years, as reputable 
underwriters. We also use top five as a variant of this definition. The results are presented under 
Regressions 6 and 7 respectively. Contrary to the existing evidence, we find that underpricing is 
greater if the issue is managed a reputed underwriter. However, the statistical significance of this 
finding is relatively weak (significant at the 10% level), and it is not significant when the 
definition is changed to the top five underwriters. This result also shows that better reputation 
may create greater over-reaction in the Indian market.    
It should be noted that the adjusted R-squared reported is quite low in Table 4, ranging 
between 4 percent to 6.5 percent. This indicates that the independent variables, while statistically 
significant, explain only a small proportion of the variance in the initial returns. However, a low 
adjusted R-squared is a common feature in many IPO-related studies, perhaps due to structural 
shifts that are not captured in the use of combined time-series, cross-sectional data. For example, 
a related certification based paper by Carter, Dark and Singh [1998], reports much lower 
adjusted R-squared ranging between 2 to 4 percent. 
4.2.3 Sample Selection Issues 
As noted in our discussion of Table 1, the degree of underpricing, on average, among the 
four group categories has declined over the years. The question arises as to whether this secular 
decline is due to changes in the cross-sectional composition of the categories over the years.  We 
try to explicitly examine this issue of changes in the composition of the four categories over the 
years, across the three regimes, notwithstanding the substantial variation in the sizes of the 
sample over the years. Econometrically, this amounts to testing whether the degree of 
underpricing of the IPOs of individual firms is correlated with the characteristics of each group 
category.  We need to examine whether ignoring the correlation between firm characteristics and 
the characteristics of each group category in estimating the relationships documented in Tables 3 
and 4 would lead to biased estimates of the quantitative effects of firm characteristics on the 
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level of underpricing. We implement these tests, by creating characteristics for each group 
category, for each of the corresponding firm characteristics, by calculating the average value of 
the characteristics for all firms in that category. With these variables for the characteristics of the 
group categories, we aim to capture the potential group effects. Although not reported in the 
paper, we find the coefficients of the group characteristics variables to be statistically 
insignificant. This indicates that there was not much cross-sectional variation among the 
categories in terms of their group characteristics over time, and that the attribution of 
underpricing to firm characteristics seen in Tables 3 and 4 is robust. 
However, averaging the group characteristics may mask the sample selection bias 
because the characteristics of a firm may dictate into which category it falls. In other words, if 
the characteristics of firms that are in the stand-alone category are different from those of the 
group-affiliated firms, the differences in underpricing may be driven by such ex ante differences 
and create an endogeneity bias. We verify the robustness of the cross-sectional variation in group 
characteristics by using the propensity score matching method. Under this method, we match the 
sample based on the propensity for underpricing, rather on the group classification.  IPOs with 
underpricing more than (less than or equal to) 0% are defined as underpriced (not underpriced).22 
We calculate the propensity scores of each observation in our sample by running a logistic 
regression with the propensity of underpricing as the dependent variable (0: no underpricing/ 1: 
underpricing). The independent variables are the group characteristics defined by the variables 
used in Table 4. Consequently, firms that have equal propensity to underprice will be matched, 
irrespective of their affiliation. Thus, the propensity score-based matching eliminates the 
systematic differences between the groups.  
We then divide the sample into quintiles, based on their propensity scores and regroup 
the firms in each quintile into group-affiliated and non-group affiliated firms based on group 
characteristics. We report the t-values based on non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test for each 
quintile for all group characteristics in Table 5.  We expect that the t-values should be 
insignificant, if there had been cross-sectional variation in the average group characteristics over 
                                                 
22 We use two alternative measures of underpricing, using 5% and 10%, as the cut-off for 
measuring underpricing to test the robustness of our procedure.  The results reported here are for 




time. However, if the group characteristics had been relatively stable, the t-values of the mean 
differences should be significant. The results in Table 5 show that the group-affiliated firm 
characteristics are significantly different from those of stand-alone firms, even after propensity 
score matching. This confirms that the characteristics of firms in the different categories 
remained relatively stable over our sample period.  
4.3 Post-IPO performance 
4.3.1 Firm survival analysis 
< INSERT TABLE 6 HERE> 
We further investigate the post-IPO performance of firms in the various categories to 
gain some insight into the long term survival and stock market performance of the firms that 
issued an IPO. This analysis is useful in comparing our results with those in the Dewenter et.al. 
[2001] study, to understand the long term effects of group affiliation along with the short term 
effects.  
We estimate the success probability of a given firm based on its category of affiliation by 
using an ordered probit model. We use the current listing band of a given IPO in the Bombay 
Stock Exchange in India (BSE) as a proxy for the long-run success of the IPO. The BSE 
classifies all listed stocks into different quality bands, namely, A, B1, B2, C and Z groups.21  
Shares that are classified in the A band are generally the large, liquid, blue chips of the Indian 
stock market. B1, B2 and C follow in the quality hierarchy from high to low. The firms that are 
classified as Z are usually failures. These companies are classified as such either because they 
declared bankruptcy or because they violated the listing norms of the BSE, and were, therefore, 
suspended from trading. Thus, the BSE classification acts as a barometer for a firm’s success in 
the Indian stock market, somewhat akin to a rating from a credit rating agency. The ordered 
probit model estimates the probability of failure by taking values 1 to 4 for A, B1, B2 and Z 
categories respectively.23   
The results are presented in Table 6. We used both private Indian and private foreign 
group dummies that take the value 1 if the firm is affiliated with a private domestic or foreign 
group, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Similar to the regression models in Table 4, we report 
                                                 
23 We also ran the probit model with just three classes, A, with a value of 2, B1 and B2, in one 
class with a value of 1, and Z with a value of 0.  The results are qualitatively similar, although 
less sharp than the ones reported here. 
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results using four different models in order to assess the incremental impact of each set of 
variables on the probability of failure or success of firms. The negative, statistically significant, 
coefficients for both the domestic and private foreign group dummy variables, which are 
reported for all four models, indicate that the failure probability for a firm affiliated with either a 
private domestic or foreign group is lower than that for a stand-alone firm. In other words, if a 
firm is affiliated with either a private domestic or foreign group, the probability of the firm 
listing in the lower bands is low. The results also indicate that, on the average, firms that 
experienced higher underpricing in their IPOs have a lower probability of survival.24 The size of 
the company, measured by assets, and the extent of promoter or institutional participation in the 
IPO is also negative and significant. This indicates that large firms survive better than small 
firms. This result is consistent with the IPO literature [See Jain and Kini (1999) and Howton 
(2006)]. Also, IPOs issued during Regime 1 failed more often than those issued during the other 
two regimes. This is consistent with the opportunistic actions of “fly-by-night” entrepreneurs in 
Regime 1 as described in section II.C.25  This may be due to the fact that very few firms ventured 
into the capital market during this period, and those that did so tended to be the robust ones, 
perhaps due to the closer scrutiny of the regulator and the more demanding market conditions. 
There are no patterns in the relationship between the nature of industry affiliation and the 
survival odds, except in the banking industry. All industry affiliations have equal chances of 
failure relative to the banking sector, which seems to have a lower probability of failure.  Again, 
this may be due to the additional requirement of scrutiny by the banking regulator, in addition to 
the securities regulator. We find that the extent of underpricing is inversely related to the 
probability of failure. This indicates that firms that registered higher underpricing survive better 
than firms that experienced lower underpricing. This is consistent with the results in Table 4: 
                                                 
24 We did not use issue size as an independent variable, as one would expect its effect to wear off 
over time. 
 
25 It should be noted that companies that went public in 1991 have a maximum of 14 years in 
which to end up in the Z-group, whereas, the IPOs issued in 2004 have barely a few months to 
fail. In order to tackle this issue, we also ran the model using only Regime 1 data. The results are 
qualitatively similar to the models in Table 5. All the coefficients and their significant levels are 
similar to the values reported in Table 5. 
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group affiliated firms experienced higher underpricing. Thus, underpricing seems to be more an 
over-reaction to group affiliation than signaling higher risk, defined in terms of odds of survival.  
 Stand-alone companies represent around 80 percent of IPOs issued in the Indian market, 
while group-affiliated companies represent only 18 percent of the IPO market. However, these 
numbers need not be reflected in the probability of success of any individual firm, as measured 
by the changes of getting listed in the A and B1 bands. However, as shown in Table 2, among the 
companies that failed (ended up in the Z-group), 82 percent belong to stand-alone companies. 
Also, as shown earlier in Tables 1, 2 and 3, the size of domestic group-affiliated companies is not 
significantly different from that of stand-alone companies. The ordered probit analysis reinforces 
this conclusion in terms of the probability of success: size is not significant for the likelihood of 
success of firms making the IPO. Thus, after controlling for other variables that might affect 
their performance, both private domestic and foreign group-affiliated companies survived better 
in the post-IPO period than stand-alone companies. The reason for better survival odds for group 
companies could be due to the implicit contracts between group firms to help each other, in a 
weak legal system, in the event of distress [see Bull (1987) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997)]. 
Gopalan, Nanda and Seru [2005] also found evidence that Indian business groups tend to support 
each other through intra-group lending in cases of financial distress.26 They concluded that these 
supporting actions serve to safeguard the group’s reputation in the capital market. Our survival 
analysis partially supports this argument. Group firms might survive better, post IPO, due to this 
supporting mechanism, which is not available to stand-alone companies.27 However, the above 
evidence of greater survival odds of group firms is not conclusive. We explore the reasons for 
better survival at greater depth in the following section using additional data on intra-group 
lending and borrowing. 
4.3.2 Intra-group Lending and Borrowing 
                                                 
26 There is anecdotal evidence that this happens very often.  In a well-publicized episode 
involving Tata Finance Ltd., the group companies of the Tata group provided financial assistance 
to bail it out of financial distress in 2003. 
 
27 Since the firm classification is based largely on firm performance, size and liquidity, it is 
possible that some of the effects we document could, at least partly, be due to liquidity effects.  
We are unable to examine this issue in detail due to the lack of microstructure data - trading 
volume, bid-offer spreads etc. - for our sample.  We believe that the firm size proxies for these 
liquidity effects, at least partly.   
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We lend further credence to the hypothesis of group support for survival of group-
affiliated firms by examining the intra-group lending and borrowing in the Indian family 
business groups. The main mechanism of intra-group support for companies in a business group 
is through the provision of financial support for each other.  This may occur because one group 
company has surplus resources, while another has a deficit, and the financing is an arms-length 
transaction at market interest rates.  Alternatively, it may be because the controlling group has 
different cash-flow rights in the two companies and derives a benefit from such a transaction, 
which is not at market rates.  In either case, such financing provides co-insurance for group firms 
at rates that are in line or out of line with market conditions. One of the main reasons attributed 
to better survival of group firms is the co-insurance that is available in a business group. The co-
insurance hypothesis states that business groups help each other in the case of adverse conditions 
and thus survive better than non-group firms [see Khanna and Yafeh (2005]. Thus, the co-
insurance hypothesis suggests that there should be intra-group bi-directional flows based on 
necessity. For instance, if a group firm makes a loss, then it should borrow more from other firms 
in the group with a surplus, and similarly, a firm that makes profits should lend more to other 
firms that are in need of funds. 
We were able to obtain data on these loans to and from group firms for the years 2000 
until 2005.28  We first test the differences between loans to group firms (LTG) and borrowing 
from group firms (BFG) for profit- versus loss-making firms.   We then examine the extent to 
which LTG and BFG can be explained by the profit or loss made by each firm.  . 
< INSERT TABLE 7 HERE> 
The results are arranged in two panels in Table 7. In Panel A, all the group firms are 
segregated as profit- or loss-making firms on a yearly basis, with the last column reporting 
aggregate profit or loss for all years between 2000 and 2005. We then test for the differences for 
the LTG and BFG variables between the two sets of firms for each year and for the whole period.  
The results show that there is a significant difference between profit making and loss making 
firms based on the loans given to the group firms (LTG): profit- making firms lend significantly 
more than loss-making firms. This finding is consistent with the co-insurance hypothesis. In the 
                                                 
28 Unfortunately, we were not able to get the data for the total sample period mainly due to the 
non-availability of such data for a large proportion of the firms in our sample. 
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case of borrowing (BFG), the aggregate borrowings of loss-making firms are higher than for 
profit-making firms. However, unlike lending, the difference is not statistically significant.  
We test this relationship more formally using regression analysis. Panel B reports 
regression results examining the relationship between the extent of lending (borrowing) and the 
operational performance of group firms, measured by operating income. We also use firm age, 
size (measured as total assets) and financial health (measured as solvency ratio) as the control 
variables. We test lending (LTG) and borrowing (BFG) separately. A positive coefficient for 
operating income in the lending regression confirms more lending by profitable companies. 
Similarly, a negative coefficient for operating income in the borrowing regression confirms more 
borrowing by loss making firms. However, similar to panel A, the results in the case of 
borrowing are not statistically significant. These results suggest that when firms have surplus 
resources, they are likely to lend them to group companies that need assistance.  However, when 
firms have deficits, they may not obtain help from group companies, but perhaps they need to go 
outside the group, in addition.  All in all, our intra-group financing results support the conjecture 
that co-insurance exists in Indian family business groups. These results can explain why group 
firms survive better than stand alone firms, since such intra-group assistance may not be 
available for non-group firms. 
 
4.3.3 Long-run performance of IPOs 
< INSERT TABLES 8 and 9 HERE> 
We next analyze the long-run return performance of IPOs for firms in the various 
categories discussed earlier. The results are reported in Tables 8 and 9. Consistent with the IPO 
literature relating to the evidence in other countries [see, for example, Ritter, 1991], we find that 
the average long-run return performance of firms, post IPO, is significantly negative.  This has 
been consistently true for different horizons ― 12, 24 and 36-month windows ― indicating the 
systematic over-optimism of the investors regarding the performance of new investment 
opportunities.29 This consistent with the behavioral theory of initial overreaction and subsequent 
                                                 
29 See Ritter [1991], Levis [1993] and Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez [1993], for US, UK and 
Latin American markets respectively. Also, it should be noted that our sample size for the long 
term analysis is smaller compared to the short-term and IPO analyses, because our sample period 
does not completely cover the different horizon periods in all cases. The sample sizes are 
reported in the tables. 
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reversals proposed by many authors including, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny [1998], DHS, and 
Hong and Stein [1999].      
In Table 8, we report the long-run return performance statistics for our data set. We use 
both the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) and the Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Return (CAAR) measures for our long-run performance analysis. These are the standard metrics 
used in the IPO literature and represent different ways of defining the return: BHAR is the risk-
adjusted return based on buying at the beginning of the period and selling at the end, taking into 
account any intervening distributions, while CAAR is the cumulative average return assuming, 
compounding in each period [see, for example, Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000)].  Among the 
different firm categories we had defined earlier, we find that the magnitude of negative long-run 
stock market performance is greater for private foreign groups and private Indian groups than for 
stand-alone companies. These differences between group companies and stand-alone companies 
are statistically significantly different from zero for both these categories, over all the three 
horizons defined earlier, and also using both measures of return performance. This can be 
explained by the higher underpricing of group-affiliated firms. The subsequent long term 
reversals, as predicted in the behavioral finance literature, imply that higher underpricing should 
also result in greater reversal.   
However as indicated in Table 9, which reports whether there is any significant variation 
in long-run performance across the various categories in our sample, shows that there is no 
significant difference in long-run performance between the four groups.  There appear to be no 
clear differences among the post-IPO return measures that are statistically significant. This 
confirms the conjecture that long-run underperformance, similar to other markets, is more a 
general phenomenon across all types of firms.30 Thus, the negative performance of firms 
affiliated with domestic and foreign groups is not that significant on a relative basis.      
                                                                                                                                                             
 
30 There is a long-standing debate on mis-measurement issues related to the methodology used to 
calculate long-run performance. For instance, Brav, Geczy, and Gompers [2000] show that the 
choice of performance measurements directly determines both the size and the power of 
statistical tests. However, we believe that the magnitude as well as the consistency of our results, 
for different horizons and for both measures of return performance, is striking, notwithstanding 




We also report raw buy and hold returns for the 12, 24 and 36 month windows. The raw 
returns indicate that the performance of all IPOs over all three horizons is good, in absolute 
terms, with returns ranging between 51 per cent and 98 per cent, per annum, for all groups.  
However, when adjusted for market returns over the corresponding horizons, the excess returns 
turn out to be poor.  This is due to the fact that as in other markets, IPOs are timed to be made in 
“hot” market conditions. This is consistent with the behavioral explanation: the windows of 
opportunity hypothesis of Ritter [1991] and Loughran and Ritter [2002]. This hypothesis 
suggests that IPOs are timed when the equity of the issuer may be overvalued. It is also in line 
with the Miller (1977) argument that investors who are most optimistic will be the initial buyers.    
5. Conclusion 
We document the results of a comprehensive study of the Indian IPO market focusing on 
the effect of group affiliation on the initial performance in the post-listing market. We use a 
relatively large sample of 2,713 IPOs that were issued in India between 1990 and 2004 to test 
whether group affiliation affects the extent of underpricing. Similar to Dewenter et.al. [2001], we 
test two competing hypotheses on the relationship between group affiliation and the extent of 
underpricing. The “certification” hypothesis asserts that, in less developed capital markets, 
groups form internal capital markets to help member companies in the case of financial distress. 
Thus group affiliation acts as a positive signal, resulting in lower underpricing than for 
standalone companies. On the other hand, the “tunneling” hypothesis asserts that, due to 
excessive control of the family on group companies, the controlling family may expropriate the 
future cash flows of the affiliated companies. Thus, group affiliation acts as a negative signal, 
consequently resulting in greater underpricing. We find that underpricing is greater for firms 
affiliated with groups. Our results hold for both domestic and multi-national private foreign 
groups that are presumed to be more transparent; hence, we cannot attribute underpricing solely 
to the tunneling effect or complexity of group affiliation as argued by Dewenter et al. [2001]. 
We, therefore, extend our analysis beyond the framework of Dewenter et al. [2001] to 
uncover the possible reasons for higher underpricing in both domestic and private foreign 







groups, by examining the post-IPO success of the firms. Our survival analysis indicates that 
group-affiliated companies survive better than stand-alone companies. We conjecture that this 
could be due to a better support mechanism for group-affiliated companies than that for their 
stand-alone counterparts in the case of financial distress, as argued by Gopalan, Nanda and Seru 
[2005], since groups try to preserve their market reputation. Thus, group affiliation acts as a 
positive signal to the market. However, our long-run IPO performance results, measuring the 
stock market performance of the firms, are consistent with the results in other countries: in the 
long run, firms that were underpriced in their IPOs experience negative performance over time. 
We reconcile these two findings by arguing that investors overreact at the time of the IPO to 
group reputation with the reaction being gradually reversed over time. Using data on the extent 
of over-subscription as a proxy for excess demand, we confirm that over-reaction (measured 
using excess demand for IPOs) is positively related to underpricing.   
The greater failure rate of standalone companies in the capital market raises concerns 
over the allocation of capital and the development of entrepreneurs in emerging economies. In 
the future, many issues can be addressed based on our study. Some interesting directions are 
indicated by these questions: 1) Are family business groups optimal organizational structures in 
economies with relatively undeveloped capital markets? 2) Do group companies hinder 
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Table I Year-Wise Summary Statistics for IPOs made in India during 1990-2004 
 
This table summarizes the data on 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) issued in India during 1990-2004, on a yearly basis, for the whole period and for sub-periods (regimes). 
The data are classified into four groups, based on the nature of the ownership of the firm making the IPO; namely, Private Indian Groups, Stand-Alone Companies, Government 
Companies and Private Foreign Groups. The initial return is calculated as the proportionate change between the issue price and the first listing price on the stock exchange (the 
Bombay Stock Exchange). The total amount raised is presented in Indian Rupees. A crore is 10 million Rupees and the current foreign exchange rate (November 2005) is about 45 
Indian Rupees to one US $. The data are also classified into three regimes based on the major structural changes that occurred in the Indian primary market. Regime 1 (Reg 1) 
(1990-95) is the IPO boom period, soon after the liberalization of the Indian economy, when the regulatory restrictions were mild. During Regime 2 (Reg 2) (1996-00) restrictions 
were introduced regarding pricing and other aspects of the issue. Regime 3 (Reg 3) (2001-04) is the period after the introduction of book-building process for price discovery.  
 
 




                   
No. of Issues 7 33 74 100 129 72 415 32 7 - 10 12 61 1 4 1 2 8 484 
Total Amount Raised  
(In Rs. Crores) 
147 497.7 1045.7 1334.3 2354.7 4389.1 9768.0 1290.9 1086 - 1111.9 1591.6 5080.4 49.89 1561.5 95 402.1 2108.5 16957 
Average Issue Size  
(In. Rs. Crores) 





1.41 1.5 1.23 4.67 2.14 2.6 3.05 2.6 1.12 - 11.2 2.63 4.29 1 5.25 5 1.1 2.83 4.63 
Average Initial Return 
(%) 
85.5 299.5 219.68 141.84 93.61 34.87 145.83 18.08 38.29 - 393.54 41.33 122.81 -32.5 17.4 140 80.03 51.23 140.07 
Median Initial Return 72 180 90 40 50 20 50 2.5 7.5  393.54 -3.22 10 -32.5 12.9 140 52.17 3.5 50 
Average 30-day 
Standard Deviation 
3.70 4.49 2.92 7. 80 5.51 5.46 5.4 2.89 3.89 - 24.46 6.98 7.52 1.01 7.17 4.19 5.74 5.61 5.74 
Stand-Alone 
Companies 
                   
No. of Issues 12 40 129 270 535 738 1724 329 16 8 15 42 410 10 - 2 1 13 2147 
Total Amount Raised  
(In Rs. Crores) 
130 190.3 788.94 1436.9 3382.5 4432.1 10360 1900.2 189.9 207.3 238.48 814.23 3350.1 304.1 - 32.6 16.95 353.66 14065 
Average Issue  Size  
(In. Rs. Crores) 
12.9 4.64 6.11 5.32 6.32 6.01 6.01 5.7 11.87 29.62 15.89 19.38 8.20 17.12 - 16.3 16.95 16.97 6.62 
Average Issue 
Premium  
(Issue Price/ Face 
Value) 
1.33 1.01 1.08 1.36 1.58 1.81 1.60 1.26 1 1.24 1.26 1.58 1.28 2.37 - 1 1 1.55 2.14 
Average Initial Return 
(%) 
251 241.9 97.76 67.50 86.53 43.94 131.47 80.36 131.0 62.8 688.62 52.24 203.01 70.69 - 37.5 50 52.73 78.78 
Median Initial Return 250 175 40 30 50 20 33.33 10 17.25 5.26 353.75 11.66 12 25 - 37.5 50 37.5 30 
Average 30-day 
Standard Deviation 
8.38 5.14 2.59 2.86 3.36 3.01 3.13 1.93 3.17 3.23 13.68 2.99 2.68 2.35 - 4.60 3.06 2.91 3.06 
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Government Companies                    
No. of Issues 1 - 1 1 9 2 14 2 5 - 1 2 10 1 4 1 3 9 33 
Total Amount Raised  
(In Rs. Crores) 
- - 217.36 525 765.29 2478 3985.6 1030 1287. - 125 205.1 2647.1 150 937.6 240 715.1 2042.7 8675 
Average Issue Size  
(In. Rs. Crores) 
120 - 217.36 525 85.03 1239 306.58 515 257.54 - 125 102.54 264.77 150 234.42 240 238.35 226.97 271.13 
Average Issue Premium  
(Issue price/ Face Value) 
1 - 1.5 1 3.05 2 2.5 5 1.5 - 1.5 4.75 2.66 4.27 1 1 5.33 2.98 3.5 
Average Initial Return 
(%) 
-71 - 370 21.42 55.04 -20.04 106.60 146.98 10.94 - 23 -4.5 44.105 -5 33.58 49.1 52.18 32.46 53.62 
Median Initial Return -71 - 370 21.42 5 -20.04 0.57 146.98 8.88 - 23 -4.5 8.19 -5 2.5 49.1 52.17 22.85 11.66 
Average 30-day Standard 
Deviation 
55.3 - 1.38 4.07 4.38 2.57 7.5 2.78 6.47 - 0.63 0.33 4.92 0.25 1.14 0.38 2.09 1.27 1.27 
Private Foreign Groups                    
No. of Issues 2 9 6 7 8 7 39 3 - 1 1 4 9 - - - 1 1 49 
Total Amount Raised  
(In Rs. Crores) 
7.73 80.4 99.07 119.73 170.61 70.98 548.52 47.38 - 1.75 55.13 291.04 395.3 - - - 365 365 1309 
Average Issue Size  
(In. Rs. Crores) 
3.86 8.93 16.51 17.10 21.32 21.32 14.06 10.14 - 1.75 55.13 58.54 37.60 - - - 365 365 24.99 
Average Issue Premium  
(Issue Price/ Face Value) 
5.25 6.83 6.63 4.5 7.42 2.5 5.71 2.41 - 4 4.5 2.37 2.80 - - - 7 7 8.76 
Average Initial Return 
(%) 
275 1392. 157.5 261.3 92.70 24.28 367.13 44.5 - 1899 152.2 356.54 613.06 - - - 26.98 26.98 351.01 
Median Initial Return 275 700 115 137.5 75 30 100 50 - 1899 152.22 21.77 26.98 - - - 26.98 26.98 75 
Average 30 day Standard 
Deviation 
2.22 9.99 2.88 3.09 2.90 3.01 4.56 1.17 - 8.73 94.4 5.49 14.27 - - - 5.49 36.78 7.08 
Descriptive Statistics of 
the Total Sample 
                   
No. of Issues 22 82 210 378 681 819 2192 366 28 9 27 60 490 12 8 4 7 31 2713 
Total Amount Raised  
(In Rs. Crores) 
10.5
6 
9.25 10.27 9.03 9.68 11.14 10.15 17.16 58.64 29.62 56.68 46.44 19.64 30.41 324.96 91.90 225.92 147.67 13.22 
Average Issue Size  
(In. Rs. Crores) 
27.6
9 







Average Issue Premium  
(Issue price/ Face Value) 
4.86 1.03 1.43 1.82 2.23 1.90 1.95 2.86 1.56 3.37 13.16 10.12 3.17 4.96 19.85 9.8 30.9 14.60 2.29 




389.49 145.23 90.63 87.67 42.87 90.88 105.56 103.94 62.86 534.82 121.81 111.02 70.69 26.68 66.06 38.32 49.21 95.36 
Median Initial Return 225 200 50 33.33 50 20 40 10 10 5.26 201.66 10 11.83 20 21.59 54.58 38.49 22.85 30 
Average 30 day Standard 
Deviation 






Table II Comprehensive Descriptive Statistics for IPOs issued in India during 1990-2004 
 
This table summarizes the data on 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) issued in India during 1990-2004, in terms of various descriptive statistics. The data are classified into four 
groups, based on the nature of the ownership of the firm making the IPO; namely, Private Indian Groups, Stand-alone Companies, Government Companies and Private Foreign 
Groups. The initial return is calculated as the proportionate change between the issue price and the first listing price on the stock exchange (the Bombay Stock Exchange). The 
average asset size and the issue size are presented in crores of Indian Rupees. A crore is 10 million Rupees and the current foreign exchange rate (November 2005) is about 45 
Indian Rupees to one US $. The average 30-day standard deviation is calculated by using the stock returns from day 1 to day 30 after the stock is listed on the stock exchange. 
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Raw Buy and Hold Return (36 Months) (%)  57 85 88 56 








Percentage of Companies in Z-group of BSE (as of 31.12. 2004)  13 86 0.1 0.9 









Table III One-Way ANOVA Multiple Means Comparison Test for IPOs of Private Indian Groups, Stand-Alone Companies, Government 
Companies, and Private Foreign Groups during 1990-2004 
 
This table is based on data for 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) issued in India during 1990-2004. The data are classified into four groups, based on the nature of the ownership 
of the firm making the IPO; namely, Private Indian Groups, Stand-alone Companies, Government Companies and Private Foreign Groups. The initial return is calculated as the 
proportionate change between the issue price and the first listing price on the stock exchange (Bombay Stock Exchange). The asset size and issue size are presented in crores of 
Indian Rupees. A crore is 10 million Rupees and the current foreign exchange rate (November 2005) is about 45 Indian Rupees to one US $. The test statistic presented below 
relates to the differences between the means in different groups based on the Tukey multiple comparison test. This test allows a comparison of the means simultaneously for 
multiple samples. For instance, in the case of the initial return variable, the Private Indian Group sample mean is first compared with that of the other three groups. The Stand-
Alone Companies sample is also compared in the same manner, but leaving out the Private Indian Group sample, which was compared in the first set. * and ** indicates 
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Table IV Regression Results with Initial Return as the Dependent Variable 
 
This table is based on data on 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) issued in India during 1990-2004. The table presents multiple regression results based on the following 
equations. (Note: For brevity, only one regression equation is reported. The other equations are nested in Regression 7 below, but with fewer variables on the right hand side).  
Regression 7: Ln(Initial return+1) = c + a1 Ln(Asset Size) + a2 Ln(Issue Size) + a3 Private Indian Groups dummy +  a4 Stand-Alone Companies dummy + a5 Government 
Companies dummy + a6 Private Foreign Group dummy + a7 Banking Companies dummy + a8 Financial services Dummy + a9 Manufacturing Companies dummy +a10 Other 
Services Companies dummy + a11 Regime1 + a12 Regime2 + a13 Regime3 + a14 Promoters’ subscription + a15 Public Investors subscription + a16 Institutional Investors 
subscription + a17 Other investors contribution +  a18 Extent of Subscription + a19 Underwriter Quality + e  
The regressions are aimed at testing the relationship between underpricing and variables of interest; namely: asset size, issue size, Private Indian Group dummy, Stand-Alone 
Companies dummy, Government Companies dummy, Private Foreign Group dummy, Banking Companies dummy, Financial Services (ex-banking) Companies dummy, 
Manufacturing Companies dummy, Other Sectors dummy. Promoter’s Subscription represents the percentage invested by the promoters for the IPO; Public Investors Subscription 
represents the percentage subscribed by the public for the IPO; Institutional Investors’ Subscription represents the percentage invested by the institutional investors, while Other 
Investor’s Subscription (omitted here as an independent variable) represents  the rest of the participation in the IPO. Extent of subscription reports how many times an issue is over 
or under subscribed. Value 1 indicates no over or under subscription. Underwriter quality is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the underwriter is one of the top 5 (top 10 in 
Regression 6) underwriters in terms of the value underwritten.  Apart from these variables, the table also reports the coefficients for the regime dummies. Regime 1 is a dummy 
variable for regime 1 (1990-1995); Regime 2 is a dummy variable for regime 2 (1996-2000); Regime 3 is a dummy variable for regime 3 (2001-2004).  The extent of subscription 
measures the number of time an IPO is over subscribed.  Regression 8 presents the results from the second stage of the two-stage least squares regression using firm size as the 
instrument variable.  *, **, *** represent significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The t-values are in parentheses. 
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N 1914 1913 1913 1905 1905 1905 1905 1245 




Table V Results of Propensity Score Matching 
 
This table reports the t-values based on mean difference tests for various firm characteristics of Indian group-affiliated firms and stand-alone firms. The variables 
are first sorted into quintiles (Q1 to Q5 in the table) based on their propensity scores. The propensity scores are calculated using a logistic regression with the 
probability of underpricing as the dependent variable and all the variables reported in Table 4 as independent variables. The dependent variable takes value 1 (0) 
for underpricing (no underpricing). Underpricing is defined based on a cut-off of 0% - firms with underpricing above (below) 0% are defined to be underpriced 
(not underpriced). N reports number of stand-alone firm observations (Indian group observations). The reported values are t-values using non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed rank test.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 





     
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Asset Size -7.81*** -8.39*** -7.29*** -9.91*** -9.20*** 
Issue Size -8.06*** -9.82*** -8.89*** -9.82*** -7.39*** 
Share 
Premium 
-6.19*** -4.52*** -6.65*** -9.63*** -1.94** 
Promoter’s 
Subscription
-1.13 -1.60 -1.88* -3.15*** -4.48*** 
Public 
Subscription
-5.38*** -0.88 -3.02*** -4.35*** -4.07*** 
Institutional 
Subscription
-0.25 -3.31*** -0.859 -2.25** -4.11*** 
Over 
Subscription
-4.17* ** -2.55** -2.71** -2.89 ** -2.36** 




Table VI Ordered Probit Model Results 
 
This table is based on data on 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) issued in India during 1990-2004. The table reports IPO post-performance results. We use an ordered 
probit model to measure the likelihood of success (or failure) for a given IPO after listing on the stock exchange. The proxy for success (or failure) is the current 
(as of Dec. 2004) listing category on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE).  The BSE classifies all listed firms into different quality bands. There are four main 
quality-based bands on the BSE; namely, A, B1, B2, and Z. The A band represents the best quality stocks in terms of size, liquidity and financial performance 
and the rest follow in hierarchical sequence, with the Z band representing firms that have violated BSE listing norms or have been declared bankrupt. In the 
ordered probit model, firms take the values 1 through 4, corresponding to current listing bands of A, B1, B2 and Z, respectively.  We also use all the control 
variables that are used in Table 4. The ordered probit model (Model 4) is represented as follows: Prob(Failure) = c + b1 Ln(Size of firm at the time of IPO) + b2 
(Private Indian Group dummy) + b3 (Stand-Alone Companies dummy) + b4 (Government Companies dummy) + b5 (Private Foreign Group dummy) +  b6 
(Banking Companies dummy) + b7 (Financial Services Companies dummy ) + b8 (Manufacturing Companies dummy) + b9 (Other Services dummy) + b10 
(Regime 1) + b11 (Regime 2) + b12 (Regime 3 dummy) + b13 (Promoters’ Contribution) + b14 (Public Investors’ Contribution) + b15 (Institutional Investors’ 
Contribution) + b16 (Other Investors’ Contribution) + b17 Ln( %of initial return +1) + e.  Note that models 1, 2 and 3 are variations of model 4, with or without 
sector dummies, regime dummies and subscription details, respectively.  Model 5 includes all variables that are presented in the table. *, **, *** represent 
significant levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The z-values are in parentheses. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
C - - - - 
















Stand-Alone Companies dummy - - - - 















































Regime 3 - - - - 
Promoters’ contribution - - - 0.004  
(1.33) 
Public investors’ contribution - - - 0.008 
(1.33) 
Institutional investors’ contribution - - - 0.001  
(0.22) 
Other investors’ contribution - - - - 








N 1884 1884 1884 1876 
Log Likelihood -1445.51 -1441.94 -1429.85 -1441.93 
Pseudo R-Square  0.08 0.09 0.098 0.104 
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Table VII Additional Test for the Co-insurance Hypothesis 
 
This table reports the results of additional tests of the co-insurance hypothesis. The results are arranged in two panels: Panel A reports the mean difference test 
results between profit- and loss-making firms, for each year from 2000 to 2005 and for the aggregate values for all the years in the last column. The mean values 
are presented in crores  A crore is 10 million and the current foreign exchange rate (November 2005) is about 45 Indian Rupees to one US $. The t-values are 
reported in the last row of Panel A. Panel B reports regression results to understand the relationship between the extent of loans and borrowing and firm operative income. The 
dependent variable in the first [second] column Loan To Group Firms (LTG) [Borrowing From Group Firms (BFG)]. The independent variables are Profit Before Depreciation, 
Interest and Taxes (PBDIT), Age of the firms (Ln(Age), Total Assets (Ln(TA), and Solvency Ratio (SR) respectively. The t-values are reported in parentheses. The mean values 
are presented in crores  A crore is 10 million and the current foreign exchange rate (November 2005) is about 45 Indian Rupees to one US $. The t-values are reported in the last 









PANEL A:  Mean Difference Analysis for Testing Co-insurance Hypothesis  
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
 LTG BFG LTG BFG LTG BFG LTG BFG LTG BFG LTG BFG LTG BFG 
LOSS 4.24 0.47 2.65 0.32 3.06 1.46 4.37 1.61 1.88 2.55 1.74 4.19 3.80 1.15 
PROFIT 9.29 0.38 9.70 0.69 13.04 0.67 18.76 0.51 20.43 0.55 36.66 0.25 15.80 0.61 
t-value -1.27 0.36 -2.04* -1.39 -1.99* 0.60 1.99* 0.82 -2.07* 1.18 -1.51 1.03 -4.16*** 1.19 
PANEL B: Regression Analysis for Testing Co-insurance Hypothesis 




















(0.13)             
Adj. R2 0.83 0.09             
N 4271 4271             
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Table VIII IPO Long-Run Performance Results 
 
This table is based on data on 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) issued in India during 1990-2004. The table shows the average cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) of 
firms on the BSE 100 index, and the average buy and hold returns (BHAR) of firms on the BSE 100. CAAR and BHAR are calculated and reported for different 
periods: for 12, 24 and 36 months respectively. The number of observations (N) varies based on the time period used to calculate CAAR and BHAR. CAAR is 
defined as 1/nCARi; where CARi = Σt= 1 to T (Rit –Rmt), T = 12 or 24 or 36 months. BHAR is defined as 1/n BHERi; where BHERi = Πt=1 to T (1+Rit) – Π (1+Rmt), T 
= 12 or 24 or 36 months, Rit = return of firm I and Rmt is the market bench mark return (BSE 100 index return). We also report raw buy and hold returns for the 
12, 24 and 36 month windows. * indicates values are significant at the 0.01 level.  The t-values are reported in parentheses. 
 


















































































































Table IX One-Way ANOVA Multiple Mean Comparison Test for Testing the Significant Difference Between the Long-Run 
Performance of Different Groups. 
 
This table is based on data on 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) issued in India during 1990-2004, on a yearly basis. The data are classified into four groups, based on the nature 
of the ownership of the firm making the IPO, namely, Private Indian Groups, Stand-Alone Companies, Government Companies and Private Foreign Groups. The initial return is 
calculated as the percentage of rate of change between the issue price and the first listing price on the stock exchange (Bombay Stock Exchange). A crore is 10 million and the 
current foreign exchange rate (October 2005) is about 45 Indian Rupees to one US $. The Test of Differences is based on the Tukey Multiple Comparison Test. This test allows a 
simultaneous comparison of the means for multiple samples. For instance, in the case of the initial return variable, the Private Indian Group sample mean is compared with those of 
the other three groups. The Stand-Alone Companies sample is also compared in the same manner, but, leaving out the Private Indian Group sample, which was compared in the 
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Figure I Trends in the Number of Issues of IPOs by Various Categories of Firm Groups in India during 1990-2004 
 
 
This figure depicts  the data on 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) issued in India during 1990-2004, on a yearly basis, for the whole period and for sub-periods (regimes). The 
data are classified into four groups, based on the nature of the ownership of the firm making the IPO; namely, Private Indian Groups, Stand-Alone Companies, Government 
Companies and Private Foreign Groups. The initial return is calculated as the proportionate change between the issue price and the first listing price on the stock exchange (the 
Bombay Stock Exchange). We also include BSE 100 (a market bench mark index) annual return as a measure of Indian stock market trends during the same period. The data are 
also classified into three regimes based on the major structural changes that occurred in the Indian primary market. Regime 1 (Reg 1) (1990-95) is the IPO boom period, soon after 
the liberalization of the Indian economy, when the regulatory restrictions were mild.  During Regime 2 (Reg 2) (1996-00), restrictions were introduced regarding pricing and other 


































Private Indian Group Companies Stand-Alone Companies Government Companies
Private Foreign Group Companies All Companies BSE 100 Index return









Figure II Trends in the Initial Returns of IPO Issues by Various Categories of Firm Groups in India during 1990-2004 
 
 
This figure depicts  the data on the initial returns of 2,713 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) issued in India during 1990-2004, on a yearly basis, for the whole period and for sub-
periods (regimes). The data are classified into four groups, based on the nature of the ownership of the firm making the IPO; namely, Private Indian Groups, Stand-Alone 
Companies, Government Companies and Private Foreign Groups. The initial return is calculated as the proportionate change between the issue price and the first listing price on 
the stock exchange (the Bombay Stock Exchange). The data are also classified into three regimes based on the major structural changes that occurred in the Indian primary market. 
Regime 1 (Reg 1) (1990-95) is the IPO boom period, soon after the liberalization of the Indian economy, when the regulatory restrictions were mild.  During Regime 2 (Reg 2) 
(1996-00), restrictions were introduced regarding pricing and other aspects of the issue. Regime 3 (Reg 3) (2001-04) is the period after the introduction of a more transparent book-
building process for price discovery.   It should be noted that the peak of Private Foreign Group Companies in 1998 may be slightly misleading, since there is only one observation 
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